Introduction
The role of ethnicity in the development process is still poorly understood. Ever since the work by Horowitz (1985) , researchers tried to disentangle the various dimensions of ethnicity and its impact on numerous aspects of a country's development. Generally, ethnically diverse countries seem to bear a particularly high burden in the development process. Ethnically diverse countries exhibit lower macroeconomic stability (Alesina and Drazen, 1991) , lower growth rates (Easterly and Levine, 1997) , and increased corruption (Mauro, 1995) .
Additional evidence suggests that ethnicity might also hamper the provision of public goods, such as education. Evidence derived from the impact of ethnicity on education provides an interesting example for the impacts of ethnicity on the provision of public goods (or near public goods) in general.
1 Education is widely assumed to be of particular importance for the development process. Improving educational outcomes seems to have a positive impact on productivity and earnings, and hence on growth rates (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992; Michaelowa, 2000; and Hanushek and Kimko, 2000) . Furthermore, increasing mothers' education is assumed to improve children's health and reduce fertility rates. This, in turn, is viewed to increase growth rates and thereby to drive development (Cochrane, 1979; and Glewwe, 1998) . Moreover, studies suggest that education plays an important role in fighting the spread of HIV/Aids (Kelly, 2000) . The development effects of education are particularly strong for primary and lower secondary education. This is also understood by international organizations and the donor community, who target their policies specifically on primary education in developing countries.
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Evidence on the impact of ethnicity on education derived from cross-country studies is, so far, rather ambiguous. Recent research started examining the underlying mechanisms of the effect of ethnicity. However, this research focused entirely on local communities and emphasized the sanctioning ability of homogenous villages found in a two country comparison (Miguel, 2004; and Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) . This sanctioning theory posits that ethnically diverse villages are unable to sanction parents that do not contribute to village funding of local schools. This leads to an under-provision of education in heterogeneous villages.
1 Note that education fails to fulfill the requirement of non-excludability for a public good, since children can be excluded from the classroom. However, education is to a large extent non-rival and generates multiple externalities.
2 For example, the Millennium Development Goal 2 targets universal primary education.
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The first theory explaining the impact of ethnicity on education posits that ethnically diverse villages exhibit lower school funding because they are unable to sanction non-contributors. A number of researchers provide evidence from the U.S. on a significant negative impact of ethnic diversity on participation in groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) , on local public goods (Vigdor, 2004) , and on education spending (Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser, 1993; and Poterba, 1997) . The most compelling argument for the impact of ethnic diversity on the local level in developing countries is provided by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) . They examine the interethnic cooperation in the education sector of Kenyan villages. In these villages, primary schooling is financed through contributions made by the parents. If parents do not contribute, they can be sanctioned. Common sanctions are the exclusion from the village, and therefore, exclusion from networks that provide social insurance. Social insurance provided by the village is especially important in countries with otherwise weak infrastructure and poor public insurance systems as found in Africa. Miguel and Gugerty (2005) argue that villages, being composed of only a few different ethnic groups, are able to impose sanctions on parents that do not contribute to the school. However, parents not being members of the predominant ethnic group in the village are less likely to be affected by such sanctions. Therefore, villages that are composed of a large variety of ethnic groups are unable to impose credible sanctions.
On the contrary, more homogenous villages exhibit higher trust and lower transactions costs, which helps them to impose sanctions (Fearon and Laitin, 1996; and Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) . According to Miguel and Gugerty (2005) , lower sanctions in diverse villages, then, translate into lower contributions for primary education. Consequently, the authors expect villages with more homogenous ethnic composition to have higher funding for primary schools. Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited:
Higher ethnic diversity is associated with lower education outcomes.
The Clientelism Effect
The second theory explaining the impact of ethnicity on education is based on the clientelism argument. Clientelism is generally associated with an under-provision of goods to all citizens and an over-provision of goods targeted to specific groups. 6 In the education sector, politicians are expected to distribute state resources for education primarily to their specific 6 clientele, which are often their co-ethnics. Since state resource distribution is primarily determined by the incumbent president, her co-ethnics are the likely beneficiaries. Therefore, one could posit the following hypothesis:
H 2 : President's co-ethnics are associated with higher education outcomes.
The majority of research supports the clientelism theory (Rainer and Franck, 2009; Miguel and Zaidi, 2003; Collier and Garg, 1999; and Barkan and Chege, 1989) . However, Kasara's (2007) study provides an interesting example of president's co-ethnics being negatively affected by substantially higher taxation than members of other ethnic groups. The empirical ambiguity might be explained by the neglect of the aforementioned studies to account for the role of ethnicity in politics, i.e. the politicization.
The Effect of Politicization and Institutions
Although some clientelistic behavior might be found in all developing countries, Posner Hence, the impact of ethnicity on education via clientelistic distribution might depend critically on the relevance of ethnicity in politics:
The clientelism effect is more pronounced in countries with politicized ethnicity.
In addition, the relevance of ethnicity in politics might also influence the sanctioning ability of villages. Whether ethnicity is perceived as a relevant political factor and a driving force in dividing voters, might also affect how members of different ethnic groups interact in a local community. If voters are strongly divided by ethnic identity, then this division might also hamper inter-ethnic cooperation on the village level. On the contrary, if citizens do not vote according to their ethnic membership, then ethnic diversity in the village will not be perceived 7 as a factor hindering inter-ethnic cooperation. Hence, in environments with non-politicized ethnicity, even very diverse villages might not suffer from the inability of sanctioning noncontributing parents (as predicted by H 1 ).
Empirical evidence supports the relationship between the sanctioning theory and politicized ethnicity. A comparison of the sanctioning mechanism in Kenya and Tanzania reveals significant variation of the effect of ethnic diversity on village funding (Miguel, 2004) . While the effect was found to be strong and significant in Kenya, it was insignificant in Tanzania.
Differences in the effect of ethnicity were attributed to different nation building policies pursued by the two countries. Miguel (2004) argues that while Tanzanian politicians emphasized unity, Kenyan politics was strongly divided by ethnic identities. One could therefore argue that the negative sanctioning effect in Kenya and the insignificant effect in Tanzania are caused by the politicization and the non-politicization of ethnicity in the two countries. From this one could posit the following hypothesis:
The sanctioning effect is more pronounced in countries with politicized ethnicity.
Closely linked to the role of the political relevance of ethnicity is the role of institutional quality. Easterly (2001) showed that the negative effect of national level ethnic diversity might be mitigated by good institutional quality. Although this interaction was established using a national level ethnic indicator, hence neglecting the underlying mechanisms, it provides some evidence for the relevance of institutional quality. The assumed negative impact of ethnic parties on a country's education outcomes might be negated by sound institutions. Moreover, stable institutions might provide a favorable environment for village funding, independent of a village's diversity and for an even distribution of government funds. Hence, institutional quality might also directly affect the impact of village sanctioning and clientelistism in the education sector:
H 5a,b : High institutional quality leads to a diminished sanctioning (H 5a ) and clientelism effect (H 5b ).
Data and Variable Selection
Assessing the impact of ethnicity on education is particularly important for a country exhibiting very diverse populations. Almost all countries with high numbers of ethnic groups, are found in Africa (Easterly and Levine (1997), p. 1219) . In addition, this region is still the least developed part of the world and in dire need of improving educational outcomes. This 8 paper will, therefore, focus on the impact of ethnicity on education in Africa and test the posited theories by using data for African countries.
Dependent Variable
Disaggregated data on district level educational outcomes for 31 African countries can be drawn from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) (MEASURE DHS, 2008) . Data on school enrollment for household members between 6-10 years and 11-15 years is used from the part "Household characteristics" of the DHS survey. According to Gardner (1998) , the official school age for primary education in the DHS surveys range from 6 to at least 10 years and hence enrollment for children aged 6-10 is used to capture the primary enrollment rate (primary enrollment). While pupils aged 10-15 years might also be still attending primary school, the majority is expected to have transited to secondary schools. Therefore, enrollment of pupils aged 10-15 is used to capture effects on secondary enrollment. 
Explanatory Variables
To test the diversity, clientelism and politicization effect, three distinct measures of ethnicity are coded. A detailed description of the rules for coding can be found in Appendix G and H.
Ethnic Diversity
The diversity variable measures ethnic diversity of districts and is used to test the sanctioning theory. 10 Information on existing ethnic groups and their location on the district level are 9 drawn from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008), and Cederman, Rød, and Weidmann (2007) .
Ethnic diversity of districts is calculated using the ethno-linguistic fractionalization (ELF) measure and ranges from 0 (complete homogeneity) to 0.99 (maximum heterogeneity).
Districts from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008) are carefully matched with the differing DHS districts (see Appendix G).
Presidents' Co-ethnics
The co-ethnics variable measures the district population shares of presidents' co-ethnics and is used to test the clientelism theory. Politics and especially state resource distribution in Africa are viewed to be primarily shaped by incumbent presidents (e.g. Kasara, 2007) .
Therefore, the ethnic group of the incumbent president is the one assumed to benefit primarily from state resource reallocation. 11 Ethnic identity of the incumbent president is coded as the identity that is politically relevant. Information on presidents' ethnic identity is drawn from Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin (2007) and district population shares of the presidents' co-ethnics are obtained from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008) . The co-ethnics indicator is a continuous variable and shares of co-ethnics range from zero to 100 percent of district population shares (see Appendix H).
Politicization of Ethnicity
The politicization variable measures the political relevance of ethnicity and is used to test the theory of politicization. Referring to Fearon (2006) , the political relevance of ethnicity can be measured by the degree to which political parties are formed along ethnic identity in contrast to parties being based on ideologies. Hence, the politicization indicator measures whether the majority of political parties (including the ruling parties) are based on ethnic identity rather than ideology or programs.
Information on the formation base on parties is drawn from the section "Political Participation" in the Polity IV Country Reports by Marshall and Jaggers (2008) for the respective countries. The information from Polity IV was used to code the politicization variable with outcome values zero, one and two. The value zero denotes that parties are entirely based on ideologies or programs. The value one denotes that voting for certain parties and a party's campaigning might evolve around ethnic identity. The value two denotes that 11 In few cases the incumbent president cannot be considered as the politician governing state affairs. Following Kasara (2007) , in those cases information on the effective leader was drawn from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2008) .
there exists an ethnic party which is supported by distinct ethnic groups and which includes ethnic identity in its campaigning.
As an example, for Kenya in 1998, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) is coded as an ethnic party due to its "extremely narrow constituency bases" 12 as well as its "ethnically based patronage rule "12 . In comparison, Benin in 1996 is coded as exhibiting moderately ethnic parties due to existence of a clear "regional foundation" 13 of political parties but lack of specific ethnic support bases. Almost 50 per cent of the countries studied do not exhibit characteristics of ethnic parties and are therefore coded as exhibiting programmatic parties (politicization=zero).
Control Variables
To ensure that the observed significant relationships between the various ethnic indicators and education are not caused by other countries' characteristics, variables on countries'
institutional and economic background, as well as countries' education system characteristics, presidents' incumbency, and time dummies are included in the regression.
A country's institutional quality is proxied using data from the Freedom House index, which measures political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2008) . This index is denoted as institutions and was re-coded into the range of -2.25 to 2.75 with positive values denoting strong institutions and negative values weak institutional quality.
Countries' income (income) is particularly relevant for educational outcomes, with richer countries having more resources to distribute in the education sector. To capture variation on the district level within countries, income is approximated using the percentage of households in the district that use "piped water" as their primary source of drinking water (MEASURE DHS, 2008) . This approach also takes into account that general GDP levels might be reversely caused by education as education is related to increased productivity and wages. In contrast, access to water is mainly determined by state-and district infrastructure spending and hence will be considered as exogenous. The aggregated piped water indicator on country level is highly correlated (0.73) with GDP (drawn from the World Development Indicator database, World Bank, 2008) . 14 Hence, access to piped water can be seen as an instrument for GDP and will be estimated in a reduced form equation.
In addition, a count variable of the years the incumbent president held power (president's incumbency) is included in the estimation since the effect of presidents' coethnics might depend on the lengths of her incumbency.
Following Michaelowa and Weber (2007) , general characteristics of countries' education systems, such as national education expenditure 15 , institutional quality, the share of the school-aged population, pupil-teacher ratio, are considered to influence education outcomes. Education expenditure, measured as current education expenditure in percent of GNI (education expenditure), is included in the estimation to control for the overall level of funds allocated to education. In addition, the share of school-age children (children) is used to account for the demand for schooling and includes children aged 0-14 years as a percentage of overall population. Furthermore, the pupil-teacher ratio in primary schools (pupil-teacher ratio) is included in the estimation of primary enrollment rates. Information on education expenditure; number of children and pupil-teacher ratios are available from the World Development Indicator (WDI) database (World Bank, 2006) .
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Furthermore education outcomes might increase slowly over time. Therefore, dummies for three different five-year periods are included allowing for a general time trend over these periods. Dummy variables for the period 1990-1994 (1990), 1995-1999 (1995), and 2000-2006 (2000) are created and 1995 and 2000 are included in the estimation. 
Econometric Results
The dataset includes pooled observations of countries and multiple time points (for example Eritrea in 1995 and Eritrea in 2002) 18 and variables on district and country level. Due to the two-level structure of the data, estimating a hierarchical model is required. Standard OLS assumes that observations are independent. If this is not the case standard errors are too small and effects might become spuriously significant. Because of the hierarchical structure of the dataset, the independency assumption is not met. More precisely, estimating the similarity of 15 Note that from the theoretical part, ethnicity is expected to affect education spending on the national level not by changing the absolute amount of money spent on education but by altering the distribution of funds over country' districts. Hence, including a measure for national education expenditure will not bias estimations of the clientelism effect.
16 The few missing values in pupil-teacher ratios and income are approximated by values for the respective variable of proximate years for the same country. below contains all significant effects found for district-and country-level variables as well as significant random slopes. The assumption of normality of the error terms was tested and outliers were excluded for both primary and secondary enrolment. 20 Estimation results reported in Table 1 were obtained estimating the model without the outliers. Coefficients do not change substantially when outliers are excluded (see Appendix B and C, column 7) and differences in estimations are reported in footnotes under Nigeria (1990 Nigeria ( , 1999 Nigeria ( , and 2003 and Rwanda (2000) . Rwanda might be an exception due to its small size and to the unusual high foreign aid inflows after the 1994 genocide (OECD/DAC, 2008) . This increased level of aid might have boosted enrollment in the succeeding years. In the case of Nigeria, the problem might be the coding of ethnicity as adopted from Kasara (2007) . Kasara coded the leaders in Nigeria as being members of "Middle Belt", which is the association of the administrative districts in the middle part of the country. This part is inhabited by various different ethnic groups, with one being the Hausa ethnic group. In contrast to Kasara, other researchers (Miles, 1987) report presidents in Nigeria to specifically belong to the Hausa group.
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between politicization, institution, diversity and co-ethnics (H 3 , H 4 , and H 5 ) requires two steps. Since politicization and institutions are variables on the country-level, a test of their influence on diversity and co-ethnics requires estimating the variation of the diversity and coethnics variables over country. This means β 1j and β 2j (equation 1) are estimated as random slopes by including the error terms u 1j and u 2j (equation 3 and 4). As a second step, politicization and institutions are included as predictors for the randomness of the diversity and co-ethnics coefficient (equations 3 and 4). Moreover, the impact of the district level variables diversity, co-ethnics and income on enrollment varies over countries, with parts of the variation being explained by politicization and institutions: Changing from a complete homogeneous district (diversity=0) to a complete heterogeneous district (diversity = 0.99) is associated with a decrease in primary enrollment of 8.9 points 22 on the scale of primary enrolment from 8.5 to 97.2. This is equivalent to a 10 percent decrease in primary enrolment.
In comparison, the maximum effect of co-ethnics is only half the size of the diversity effect. Changing from a district with zero co-ethnics (co-ethnics=0) to a district with 100 percent co-ethnics (co-ethnics=1) is associated with an increase in primary enrollment by 4.51 points 23 which is equivalent to an increase of 5 percent in primary enrollment rates.
Most interestingly, the coefficient of diversity does not appear to vary significantly over countries (σ 2 u1j(Diversity) is insignificant). This indicates that the effect of diversity is independent from country level variables, such as politicization and institutions and provides counterevidence to the theory. More precisely, these econometric results provide evidence to reject the hypothesis 4 and 5a, which postulated that the diversity effect depends on the level of politicization and institutional quality.
The random slope of the co-ethnic variable, in contrast, turns significant (σ 2 u2j(Coethnics) ). However, politicization and institutions are not able to explain variations of co-ethnics. Both interaction terms, Co-ethnicsXpoliticization and Co-ethnicsXinstitutions, appear insignificant in the estimation. This provides evidence to reject the hypothesis 3 and 5b, which posited a significant relationship between politicization, institutions and co-ethnics.
Besides the insignificant relation between politicization with diversity and co-ethnics, the interaction term of politicization with institutions and with income, turns out significant.
Following Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) the interaction term between the three variables politicization, income and institutions is re-estimated and significance levels for all combination of the three variables are obtained. Graph 1 depicts the marginal effect of politicization on primary enrollment as institutional quality and income varies.
22 Maximum effect of diversity=(max_diversity -min_diversity)*β 1 = (0.99-0)*-8.997. 23 Maximum effect of co-ethnics=(max_co-ethnics -min_co-ethnics)*β 2 = (1-0)*4.522. b) When outliers are included politicization turns significant at the 5 percent level (Appendix B, column 7). c) When outliers are included diversity is no more fully significant at the 10 percent level (p-value=0.103) (Appendix C, column 7). d) The random slope for diversity did not turn significant (σ 2 u1j(Diversity) ), which provides evidence that national level politicization and institutions do not change the coefficient of diversity. Co-ethnics is found to significantly vary over countries (σ 2 u2j(Co-ethnics) ) and interaction term Co-ethnicsXpoliticization and Co-ethnicsXinstitutions were included as predictors of this randomness (see Appendix B and C, model M5). Constant term is not presented here. Results obtained using a restricted maximum likely method and independent covariance structures. For an overview of variable definitions and sources, see Appendix A.
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The marginal effect of politicization is depicted on the y-axes. The x-axes depicts institutional quality, which varies from weak (-2.25) to strong institutions (2.75). In addition, the marginal effect of politicization is estimated for three typical income levels (mean income, and one standard deviation above and below the mean), which is depicted by the three different lines in Graph 1. The stars denote significance at the 95 percent level.
Graph 1: Marginal Effect of Politicization on Primary Enrollment as Institutions and Income Change
* denotes significance at the 95% level.
sd denotes standard deviation.
From Graph 1, one can infer that countries with average and good institutional quality (0-2.75) do not exhibit significant marginal effects of politicization in none of the three income levels. 24 However, once institutional quality declines (institutions<0), politicization seems to have a significantly positive influence on enrolment. Indeed, the change from programmatic to ethnic parties in countries with weak institutions is associated with an increase in enrollment rates by more than a 30 percent. For countries with low income, the marginal 24 Estimating the marginal effect for countries with highest institutional quality (South Africa) reveals a significant negative effect of politicization (see Appendix F, category IV).
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Results for Secondary Enrollment
Results for secondary enrollment are presented in Table 1 , column 3. 21 As for primary enrollment, one finds a negative effect of diversity and a positive effect of co-ethnics on secondary enrollment, both significant at the 5 percent level. This provides evidence to accept hypothesis 1 and 2. The maximum effect of ethnic diversity equals 4.61 points 26 , which corresponds to an increase in secondary enrollment of 5.3 percent. With respect to the impact of diversity on primary enrollment this effect is comparatively low.
While the effect of diversity differs from primary to secondary education, the effect of co-ethnics seems to almost be the same for the different enrollment levels. For secondary enrollment, one finds that the maximum effect of co-ethnics is 4.3 points 27 . This is equivalent to an increase in secondary enrollment by 5 percent.
Testing the hypotheses 4 and 5 by including random slopes for the diversity and coethnics variable reveals insignificant variation of diversity over countries (σ 2 u1j(Diversity) is insignificant). This indicates that none of the country level variables, such as politicization and institutions, significantly changes the diversity coefficient. Therefore, hypotheses 4 and 5a can be rejected.
The co-ethnics coefficient, however, exhibits significant variation over countries (σ 2 u2j(Co-ethnics) is significant). Trying to explain some of the variation of co-ethnics, by 25 Appendix F depicts the country-by-country plots of the marginal effects of all countries where the interaction terms turned significant in Graph 1. 26 Maximum effect of diversity=(max_diversity -min_diversity)*β 1 = (0.99-0)*-4.665. 27 Maximum effect of co-ethnics=(max_co-ethnics -min co-ethnics)*β 2 = (1-0)*4.292.
including politicization and institutions as predictors (by including the interaction terms), fail. This provides evidence to reject the hypothesis 3 and 5a as politicization and institutions cannot explain the variation of co-ethnics over countries.
In addition, the interaction between politicization and institutional quality turns significant. However, re-estimating the marginal effects of politicization on secondary enrollment for varying degrees of institutions and income (similar to Graph 1) reveals insignificant effects (not shown).
Countries' national education expenditure and income have significant positive effects on secondary enrolment and income does vary significantly over countries (σ 2 u3j(Income) ). However, while the share of the school-aged population is not significantly related to secondary education, there is a significant time effect. In comparison to the omitted time periods, a country's secondary enrollment in the period 2000-2006 is increased. The restricted-log likelihood and the Wald test indicate a good general fit of the final model.
Discussion
Summing up, the econometric results support hypothesis 1 and 2, reject hypothesis 3, 4 and 5, and provide interesting insights into the role of politicization on enrollment rates. Hypothesis 1 was supported by showing a significant negative coefficient of the diversity variable in Table 1 . Communities being composed of several ethnic groups exhibit significantly lower enrollment rates. This lends strong evidence for the validity of the sanctioning theory by Miguel and Gugerty (2005) . Heterogeneous communities seem, indeed, to suffer from a collective action problem, namely the inability to sanction non-contributing parents. This inability leads to lower school finances which translate into significantly lower educational outcomes. Table 1 , the coefficient of diversity is much smaller for secondary than for primary enrollment. Since secondary enrollment comprises children going to primary and secondary school, the difference in coefficients might be driven by the portion of children attending secondary schools. Data from developing countries reveals that there are substantial differences in the financing resources for primary and secondary education.
As seen in
28 Village funding might be particularly important for primary and less important for secondary education.
Primary schools are mainly located in one village, while the fewer secondary schools belong to various communities. While village funding is particularly relevant for primary education, 28 Households' contribution to primary education as percent of total expenditure ranges from about 20 percent of total education expenditure (Malawi) to nearly 50 percent (Zambia), see , Figure 4 .5, p.151.
secondary schooling might be mostly funded by the government. Hence, the ethnic composition of a village plays a minor role for secondary school funding and this might have resulted in smaller coefficients of the diversity variable for secondary enrollment.
The second hypothesis (H 2 ) was supported by a significant positive coefficient of the co-ethnics variable in Table 1 . Districts with high shares of president's co-ethnics exhibit comparably higher enrollment rates. This provides strong evidence for the clientelism theory.
Incumbent politicians seem to distribute state education resources primarily to their ethnic clientele, which then translates into higher enrollment rates of president's co-ethnics. clientelism that is independent from the degree of politicization and institutional quality.
Whether ethnicity is politically relevant does not substantially influence clientelistic distributions of state education resources. This lends support that policies targeted at reductions of the political relevance of ethnicity, for example through nation building policies (Miguel, 2004) , will not be able to mitigate the negative effect of the clientelistic distribution.
The role of politicization and institutions was also tested for the sanctioning effect. Again, the hypotheses (H 3 and H 5a ) are not supported by the econometric results as shown by the insignificant slope variance of the diversity variable (σ 2 u1j(Diversity) is insignificant). This strongly rejects Miguel's (2004) notion that the effect of ethnic diversity differs over countries. Miguel argues that countries with strong nation building in the past (as in Tanzania) do not suffer from ethnic diversity. This is strongly rejected by the econometric results, which do not find a significant impact of politicization on the diversity coefficient. Ethnic diversity seems to negatively affect education outcomes independent of the political relevance of ethnicity. This challenges Miguel's (2004) notion that nation building policies, designed to decrease the relevance of ethnicity in the political process, might mitigate the negative diversity effect.
Besides the insignificant influence of politicization on sanctioning and clientelism, the econometric results provided interesting insights into the direct influence of politicization on enrollment rates. As demonstrated by the significant marginal effects of politicization in 29 Similar results are found by Franck and Rainer (2009). weak institutions. Countries with average and below average institutional quality benefit from higher degrees of politicization. For countries with very weak institutions and low income, higher politicization is associated with increases in enrollment of over 30 percent.
Politicization is measured by the existence of ethnic parties. In contrast to programmatic parties, ethnic parties seem to perform better in worse environments. They seem to maintain a minimum level of education spending resulting in increased enrollment. This lends evidence to the idea that ethnic parties depend more critically on rewarding their members for their support than programmatic parties. While programmatic parties might have other means to maintain a positive relationship with their voters, ethnic parties seem to depend mainly on distribution of state resources. This explains why even in worst environments, ethnic parties are associated with increased enrollment rates.
Conclusion
Countries with a high number of ethnic groups are seen to bear a particular high burden in providing public goods. Ethnic diversity is assumed to downsize the amount of local public goods provided. However, a clear understanding of why this is happening has been, so far, not discovered. Detecting the channels through which ethnicity influences public good provision is, therefore, crucial to define policies helping to overcome the burden of ethnic diversity. This paper contributes to these efforts by providing a test of the underlying mechanisms driving the effect of ethnicity on education provision. In particular, the study identified the sanctioning, clientelism and politicization theory on education provision.
Econometric results strongly support the relevance of these theories for primary and secondary education provision in Africa. In particular, heterogeneous communities seem to suffer from increased ethnic diversity by their inability to raise sufficient funds for schooling.
Lower school funding then translates into substantially lower enrollment rates. Hence, policies targeted at supporting village fundraising activities through strengthening the local community's organizational structure would substantially improve enrollment rates.
In addition, the econometric results point to an unequal distribution of state resources from presidents primarily to their ethnic clientele. Indeed, members of the president's ethnicity exhibit significantly higher enrollment rates than members of other ethnic groups.
This effect, however, varies substantially over countries and lends credit to the idea that clientelistic distribution of state funds might be influenced by other factors still uncovered. In the econometric analysis, neither politicization nor institutional quality or income was found 21 to explain the variation of clientelistic distribution. It is left to future research to establish more detailed understanding of the mechanisms at work. Furthermore, the econometric results provide interesting insights into the role of politicization of ethnicity. The relevance of ethnicity in the political process is neither found to influence village fund raising nor state distribution of education resources. This clearly contrasts earlier findings, which proposed investing in nation-building policies as a cure to the ethnicity problem (Miguel, 2004) . Generally, nation building policies denote efforts to unite the different ethnic groups in a country and create a united identity (for example by introducing a lingua franca, such as Swahili in Tanzania). This might then lessen the political relevance of ethnicity. Unfortunately, such policies seem neither to effectively support village fundraising nor to lead to a more equal distribution of state resources.
A second intuition derived from the econometric estimation regarding politicization points to a positive influence of politicization on enrollment rates in countries with weak institutions. In contrast to programmatic parties, ethnic parties seem to maintain a minimum level of education spending even in adverse environments. Further research should investigate the relationship between institutional quality and ethnic parties and derive a clearer understanding of the interactions between politicians and voters which seem to differ in programmatic and ethnic parties. 
Appendix A: Variables and Descriptive Statistics

II. Countries with low institutional quality
Note: The marginal effect of politicization for Urban_governates is not significant.
Note:
The marginal effect of politicization for Urban_governates is not significant.
The marginal effect of politicization for Conacry is not significant. Note: The marginal effect of politicization for Nairobi Area is not significant.
The marginal effect of politicization for Nairobi Area is not significant. 
III. Countries with average institutional quality
Note: The marginal effect of politicization is only significant for districts close to mean income (=0.0023).
IV. Countries with sound institutions
Note: The marginal effect of politicization for Central is not significant. 
Specification of Appendix F
The graphs depict the marginal effect of politicization on primary enrolment for those countries that exhibit a significant interaction term as identified in Graph 1 (29 out of 61). Calculations are performed using the regression coefficients reported in The diversity variable is designed to capture the heterogeneity of the population at the district level. This variable has per se no political dimension but is a pure summation of all ethnic groups in the district. To code the ethnic diversity on the district level information is needed on (i) the districts used and (ii) the calculation of diversity. The following section will describe the two steps (i,ii) in greater detail and concludes with a presentation of some limitations of the data (iii).
(i) Which districts?
The districts from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008) are matched with the DHS districts. Information on alternate names of districts and development of district organization that permits matching of the two databases was found at the STATOIDS (2008).
(ii) Calculation of diversity
To calculate the diversity on district level, the widely used formula for the ethno-linguistic fractionalization measure as used by Alesina et al. (2003) is used:
Where s ij = share of ethnic group i in country j 31 .
When several smaller districts from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008) are included in a larger district in DHS, then the calculation is as follows. First, the population of one ethnic group in all three smaller districts is added and divided by the sum of the population of the three smaller districts. This group-share is then used to calculate the diversity.
(iii) Limitations of diversity data
Several limitations have to be kept in mind when working with the data from Cunningham and Weidmann (2008) . First and most important, the list of ethnic groups and their population shares do not vary over time but is constant to the original coding of the Atlas Narodov Mira in 1964 (Bruk (1964 
